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This paper presents a compilation of interesting models to treat sovereign debt portfolio 
applied to debt management offices.  It starts with an analytical balance sheet and net 
worth optimization and evolves onto policy decisions based on deterministic and 
stochastic debt simulation models.  Important risk measures derived from Value-at-Risk 
variations are drawn from these, which enables debt managers to prospect the results of 
a given funding strategy. Finally, further analysis on the asset side are introduced in 
light of the shape and size of government liabilities to verify if policy decisions change 
in such circumstances.   The conclusion is that while balance sheet and net worth 
optimization are more affine to optimal taxation theory, debt service simulation models 
are more appealing to most practioneers. 
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This paper will introduce risk modeling tools capable of helping debt managers to 
measure their exposure to certain risks originated on their portfolio.  First, it will take 
advantage from the BSA
2
 discussion held in many articles [Proite,(2014)], [Das et 
al,(2012b)], [Allen et al,(2002)], to unfold it into more elaborated ALM
3
 risk models 
considering optimality in the balance sheet, its implications on debt sustainability and 
the government’s investment decisions of its assets to protect the budget from 
permanent effects coming from macroeconomic shocks.  Second, debt service 
simulation models are discussed under an ALM context.  While presenting the tools 
commonly used to treat debt portfolio risk, it will discuss the applicability of these to 
developing economies.  
Having that said, it will be observed that institutional set up and hindered market access 
may represent meaningful restrictions to some countries to build on these frameworks 
towards more analytical models such as long term optimal benchmark. Nevertheless, the 
discussion will follow a step-by-step approach that would shed some light on specific 
types of risk exposure inherent for most debt portfolios. Such discussion could be used 
to evaluate the functionality of the financial system and local capital market, currency 
and maturity composition of external debt and optimal reserve accumulation. 
Some articles have pointed that BSA approach holds a few shortcomings [IMF, (2004)]. 
To begin with, it should be seen as a conceptual framework to oversee the types of 
exposure a given sovereign is bounded to, assessing its vulnerabilities and related policy 
options, given the prevailing political and economic environment. Policy makers should 
keep in mind that the BSA is useful to minimize financial risks while adjusting 
imbalances on the economic structure. Additionally, it is a static tool and it is hard to 
model it over time if one consider the characteristics of most relevant assets and 
liabilities. Considering those, it would be valuable to move onto models that would 
enhance risk management and allow the decision making process to be more elaborated. 
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Section 2 discusses an analytical approach to the balance sheet and how they could be 
translated in policy decisions related to debt portfolio management.  Section 3 
introduces debt simulation models divided in deterministic and stochastic techniques 
which are widely used by debt managers and are closer to more advanced debt portfolio 
benchmarking models. Important measures are derived from that.  Section 4 adds the 
asset side in the analysis and describes if the liability side reacts to that interference and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2- Balance Sheet Analytical Framework 
 
2.1- Optimal Balance Sheet Management 
During the 90’s, a great deal of countries managed to control their debt size and risk 
levels and strengthened their fiscal positions.  With that, attention was brought on 
broader balance sheet liabilities such as pension funds obligations and state owned 
enterprises (SOE) support schemes provided by the federal government.  In different 
ways, countries like Australia, New Zealand and Sweden have developed an 
institutional set up to scan other liabilities arising from the public sector.  The Swedish 
National Debt Office, for instance, has a team dedicated to monitor liabilities that may 
crystalize in their balance sheet and elaborate plans to finance those without pressuring 
market conditions. 
Discussions have been held on how to best structure government’s balance sheet 
management to reduce overall financial risk. Au-Yeung et al (2006) propose an optimal 
balance sheet approach and estimate types of assets and liabilities capable of reducing 
financing risk for the public sector. 
This framework uses a balance sheet extracted from a GFS
4
 mold, that is, putting in 
perspective assets and liabilities and defining net worth as a residual from them.  
Nonetheless, some assets are not included mainly due to valuation problems arising 
from the government side and its prime asset: the power to tax.  Considering the 
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problems from measuring certain public assets, government balance sheet management 
requires a different framework for determining optimal investment strategies.  
A government financial portfolio can be structured to reduce permanent impacts of 
macroeconomic shocks and its effects on the tax base.  Indeed, the relationship between 
taxation and balance sheet assets and liabilities is central to the economic literature 
[Barnhill and Kopits, (2003)]. 
First, the model’s intuition could be grasped from understanding an important 
conceptual tool for analyzing government balance sheet: the intertemporal budget 
constraint. This budget constraint requires that at any date, the sum of net worth and the 
net present value of taxation to be equal to the net present value of government 
spending.  In this way, the intertemporal budget constraint relates the government 
balance sheet in any period to the contingent asset and liabilities that can affect the 
balance sheet. If current government spending is higher than current taxation, the 
government can issue debt (or some other liability). However, this simply means taxes 
need to be higher sometime in the future, with potential implications on optimal 
taxation. 
For a macroeconomic shock that temporarily reduces economic growth, the government 
could resort to deficit financing by selling financial assets or issuing debt. However, if a 
non-anticipated shock lead to a permanent change in the resources available to 
government (for example, a fall in the present value of taxation revenue), the 
government would need to adjust fiscal policy because deficit financing would not be 
sustainable. Alternatively, governments could attempt to structure their financial 
portfolios to hedge against such risks [Au-Yeung et al, (2006)].  Specifically, an 
effective budget hedge would result in a positive financial return for the government 
when tax collection fades during a shock
5
.  Therefore, this framework suggests that the 
optimal portfolio for a country depends on the structure of the economy.  Apparently for 
practical reasons, it is extremely difficult to correctly evaluate and scrutinize the types 
of shocks an economy will be subjected to in the future. 
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Formally, the model has a set up where individuals are assumed to be infinitely lived, 
risk neutral, and maximize the expected utility derived from all future consumption: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜌
𝑗
𝑗≥0 𝑐𝑡+𝑗  (1) 
 
where  ρ is a discount factor, and 𝑐𝑡+𝑗 is consumption in period t + j. Individuals receive 
income 𝑌𝑡+𝑗 and pay taxes on that at a rate τt.  As taxes are distortionary there is an 
excess burden of taxation denoted by a convex loss function ℎ(𝜏𝑡).  Individuals are also 
able to trade a given set of assets, so that the individual budget constraint is given by: 
𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝑝𝑡,𝑘𝐴𝑡,𝑘𝑘 = 𝑌𝑡[1 − 𝜏𝑡 − ℎ(𝜏𝑡)] + ∑ (𝑝𝑡,𝑘+𝑓𝑡,𝑘)𝑘 𝐴𝑡−1,𝑘        (2) 
where  𝐴𝑡,𝑘 is the quantity of asset k held at the end of period t;  𝑝𝑡,𝑘  is the price of asset 
k (denoted in terms of consumption goods); and 𝑓𝑡+𝑗,𝑘  is the stream of cash flows 
derived from holding asset k. Individual maximization implies that expected returns 
across assets are equal, that is  𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘) =
1
𝜌




− 1.  This means that  expected returns are inversely proportional 
from the discount factor, a strong assumption which will simplify the optimization 
program. 
The government budget constraint is defined by   
𝜏𝑡𝑌𝑡 + ∑ (𝑝𝑡,𝑘𝐵𝑡,𝑘) = 𝐺𝑡𝑘 + ∑ (𝑝𝑡,𝑘+𝑓𝑡,𝑘)𝑘 𝐵𝑡−1,𝑘         (3) 
Where 𝜏𝑡𝑌𝑡 are tax revenues and 𝐵𝑡,𝑘 represents financing coming from debt creation, to 
finance government expenditure, 𝐺𝑡,𝑘 (treated as exogenous in this model), and to face 
debt service.   For any given financing instrument k, the government can be a net debtor 
or net lender.  Because of that, 𝐵𝑡,𝑘 could either assume positive or negative values (net 
debt).  Substituting equations (3) and (2) in (1) gives: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜌
𝑗{𝑌𝑡+𝑗[1 − ℎ(𝜏𝑡+𝑗)]}𝑗≥0             (4) 
The government chooses an optimal tax rate and debt portfolio to maximize individual 
utility (4) subject to its own budget constraint (3).   In effect, the government’s objective 
is to choose the structure of taxes and debt that minimize the expected present value of 
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the excess burden of ℎ(𝜏𝑡), that is, minimize the welfare loss coming from distortionary 
taxation.  The first-order conditions are: 
𝐸𝑡[ℎ′(𝜏𝑡+1)] = ℎ′(𝜏𝑡) , for k = 0 and  
𝜌𝐸𝑡[ℎ′(𝜏𝑡+1)(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘)] = ℎ′(𝜏𝑡) , for  k > 0      (5), 
Where k = 0 represents the case where individuals are equal off in different periods 
(possess a riskless asset).  In other words, optimality requires expected marginal excess 
burden of taxation to be constant through time. 





from the first order conditions that an optimal policy requires  
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡(𝜏𝑡+1
∗ , 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘
∗ ) = 0             (6) 
Where 𝜏𝑡+1
∗ =  𝜏𝑡+1 − 𝐸(𝜏𝑡+1)   is the unexpected component of tax rate and 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘
∗   is 
the up-to-date return of asset k.  These terms reflect the unanticipated components of 
changes in tax rates or returns, which represent a random walk. 
The draw line here is that equation (6) states that if the covariance between innovations 
in the tax rate and returns, for a specific debt, is negative then the government could 
improve tax-smoothing by issuing more of this form of debt. The converse is also true: 
if the covariance is positive then the government could improve tax smoothing by 
purchasing more of this form of debt [Au-Yeung et al, (2006)].  The main conclusion is 
that the government should smooth tax rates across different states of the world, as well 
as over time. 
To estimate the government portfolio it is necessary to introduce an equation describing 
how new taxation arises through time: 
𝜏𝑡+1
∗ = (1 − 𝜑)𝑒−?̇?[∑ 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘
∗ 𝑑𝑡,𝑘 𝑘 + ∑ 𝜌
𝑗𝑔𝑡+1,𝑗
∗
𝑗≥0 ] − 𝜏𝑡 ∑ 𝜑
𝑗𝑦𝑡+1,𝑗
∗
𝑗≥0         (7) 





 is the present 
value of future growth  rates of real output, where 𝜑 is the discount factor. Note that 
𝑦𝑡+1,𝑗
∗  describes unexpected changes in government output and its policy reaction to 
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 𝑦𝑡+1,𝑗
∗ = 𝐸𝑡+1𝑦𝑡+1+𝑗 − 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1+𝑗  , denoted as innovations. 
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raise tax at a constant rate (𝜑).  Analogously,  ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑔𝑡+1,𝑗
∗
𝑗≥0   is the present value of 
future government expenditures relative to output
7
.  The ratio of security k to output is 
denoted by 𝑑𝑡,𝑘 .  Equation (7) can be seen as government needs in terms of tax 
revenues expressed in present value to face debt stock and the spending flow discounted 
at a given rate.  That is, tax rates will need to adjust whenever there are unexpected 
changes in the value of government debt, government spending or output growth. For a 
government that is already optimally managing the balance sheet, the current tax rate 
already incorporates anticipated obligations [Au-Yeung et al, (2006)].  Doing (7) in (6), 
one may observe the optimality condition for a given government security:  
∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘
∗ , 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑙
∗ )𝑑𝑡,1 + 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1,𝑘




∗ , ∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑦𝑡+1,𝑗
∗
𝑗≥0 ) = 0              (8) 
Where   𝑤𝑡 = [
𝑒𝑦
(1−𝜑)
] 𝜏𝑡 is a weighting factor. 
That is, the government can smooth taxes to balance non-anticipated shocks in the 
present value of government spending and output through the issuance or purchase of 
state contingent securities.  Au-Yeung et al (2006) focus on shocks that affect the 
present value of output growth, assuming that the covariance between innovations in the 
present value of government spending and returns on assets (the second term in 
equation (8)), is zero. To find a solution to the government’s optimal portfolio, one must 
impose: 
𝑑 = 𝑤𝑡 ∑ ∑ 1𝑦,𝑟
−1
𝑟           (9) 
 
Where ∑ 𝟏𝒓 is the non-singular variance-covariance matrix of returns and ∑ 𝟏𝒚,𝒓 is the 
variance-covariance matrix of returns and output growth. 
 
To solve (9), one needs to calculate innovations in returns and the present value of 
future rates of growth in real output.  To simplify, a dual choice is imposed to consider 
the optimal share of local bonds versus external bonds (long term)
8
.  The return on 
domestic debt,  𝑟𝑡+1,𝑑  , is influenced by the domestic nominal interest rate 𝑙𝑡+1 ,  
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 𝑔𝑡+1,𝑗
∗ = (𝐸𝑡+1𝐺𝑡+1+𝑗 − 𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1+𝑗) / 𝑌 
8 This could be extended to other asset classes, such as equities. 
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movements on market interest rate (long term), and domestic inflation 𝜋𝑡+1.  Foreign 
long-term debt returns, 𝑟𝑡+1,𝑓   is affected by the change in the exchange rate  ∆𝑠𝑡+1.  
New returns for each type of bonds are given by:  
𝑟𝑡+1,𝑑
∗ =  − (𝑙𝑡+1,𝑑 − 𝐸𝑡𝑙𝑡+1,𝑑) − (𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) 
𝑟𝑡+1,𝑓
∗ =  − (𝑙𝑡+1,𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡𝑙𝑡+1,𝑓) − (𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + (∆𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡∆𝑠𝑡+1)         (10) 
 
To calculate these innovations in real returns, vector-autoregressive (VARs) estimations 
are used to formulate expectations for the inflation rate, the percentage change in the 
exchange rate, the long-term domestic interest rate and the long-term foreign interest 
rate. Because expectations at time t depend only on information available up to time t, 
a new VAR must be estimated for each time period.  The same method is used to 
calculate unanticipated changes in the output real growth.   
 
Finally, Au-Yeung et al (2006) have applied this model to Australian debt data and 
derived a variance-covariance matrix where deviations from domestic and external 
mean returns are negatively correlated to GDP growth.  This result is consistent with the 
literature (for example, Missale (1999)).  Specifically, the results show that it is optimal 
for the government to invest a relatively larger amount in domestic rather than foreign 
debt. This is largely driven by the volatility in the exchange rate. Volatility in the 
exchange rate (and therefore in foreign returns) is not necessarily bad, provided 
unexpected depreciation varies positively with innovations
9
 in output.   
 
The model presented above describes the inter-relationship between individual inter-
temporal decisions on consumption and attached utility, the government budget 
constraint to finance its spending and debt obligations, and then introduces the effects of 
those decisions on welfare loss in order to minimize it throughout time. With that, the 
government would balance its tax levels and portfolio decisions to manage 
unanticipated macroeconomic shocks in the present value of spending and output.  By 
doing that, debt should be structured so as to provide a hedge against macroeconomic 
shocks to the budget. The idea is that changes in the present value of government 
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revenues and expenditures can be hedged by debt returns in order to smooth tax rates, 




2.2- Net Worth and Policy Implications 
 
Another interesting work related to the sovereign balance sheet concentrate the analysis 
on targeting the concept of net worth, by using conventional accounting measures to 
forecast future spending and tax revenues, estimating a path rather than a net worth 
level.  This section discusses how an intertemporal sovereign budget constraint could be 
used to model a broad concept of net worth helping to determine long term fiscal 
settings. 
 
Bradbury et al (1997) relied on the fact that New Zealand pioneered as the first 
sovereign to fully adopt GAAP
10
 reporting to the national accounts statistics.  
Allegedly, they have benefited from greater reliability on the indicators allowing better 
financial decision making by the government and reducing inefficiencies related to 
fiscal illusion. 
 
With that, it is possible to write a government budget, for a given period t as: 
 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 − (𝐺𝑡 + 𝐻𝑡 + 𝛿𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝐷𝑡−1) + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑉𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑆𝐵 + (𝑓𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓𝑥𝑡−1)𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸                            
(11) 
Where  
𝐵𝑡: Operational Balance  
𝑇𝑡 : Non-financial Revenues 
𝐺𝑡: Government Expenditures 
𝐻𝑡: Subsidies and Transfers 
𝛿𝐴𝑡−1 : Depreciation of physical assets 
𝑖𝐷𝑡−1: Net Interest paid on the Net Debt 
 
𝜋𝑡: Net profit of Assets 
𝑉𝑡: Valuation of Commercial Forests 
∆𝑆𝑆𝐵 : Social Security Balance Changes 
𝑓𝑥𝐹𝐷𝑡 : Net gains/losses on Foreign Exchange 
denominated debt 
𝜑𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 : Net dividends/losses from State Owned 
Companies 
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A few notes must be made.  It is unusual from the sovereign balance sheet point of view 
to incorporate non-financial or physical assets in the analysis
11
. Second, despite total 
government debt has been considered as a part of spending, emphasis is given to 
external debt, which is explicitly denoted in (11) because the disturbing effects 
oscillating exchange rate could spur into the budget. 
 
It is important to express financial sustainability in terms of the relationship between the 
budgetary aggregates, and whether the projected cash outflows can be financed by the 
projected cash inflows under current policy settings. For that purpose, the intertemporal 
budget must be considered.  Before that, for any period, the budgetary financial identity 
holds for any given period t, that is, outstanding debt variation depends on the level of 
government spending, non-financial revenues net of subsidies and debt service.  
 
∆𝐷𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 − (𝑇𝑡 − 𝐻𝑡) + 𝑖𝐷𝑡−1        (12) 
or     ∆𝐷𝑡 = −𝑃 + 𝑖𝐷𝑡−1 , where P is the Primary Balance 
 
Next, the concept of Report Net Worth (RNW) is presented as the fiscal position at time 
t, and should reflect the GAAP based estimate of the residual of the balance sheet 
reflecting the transactions occurred in the previous period, that is
12
  : 
 
∆𝑅𝑁𝑊 = 𝑅𝑁𝑊𝑡 − 𝑅𝑁𝑊𝑡−1 =  𝐵𝑡         (13)   
 
The problem of the RNW it is a backward looking measure of the accounting value of 
assets less the value represented by liabilities - it records the financial effects of 
transactions that have occurred up until the reporting date and which satisfy the 
reliability criteria.  Because there are uncertainties coming from unknown future events, 
a different indicator is devised.  Comprehensive net worth (CNW) is a forward looking 
measure, which includes RNW as an opening balance (after adjustment for asset value 
performance), but which also takes into account future cash flows under current policy 
settings, and therefore captures sovereign wealth in a more satisfactory manner 
[Bradbury et al, (1997)].  The two net worth measures (reported net worth and 
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 See IMF (2004). 
12 Originally, Bradbury et al (1997) suggest  ∆𝑅𝑁𝑊 = 𝑅𝑁𝑊𝑡 − 𝑅𝑁𝑊𝑡−1 =  𝐵𝑡 + 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠.  
Because of the discussion on practical reasons held in section 2, physical assets will be disregarded 
without harming the analysis. 
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comprehensive net worth) focus on different things and have different implications for 
decision making. CNW is defined as: 
 
𝐶𝑁𝑊𝑡 = 𝑅𝑁𝑊𝑡−1 + ∑ (
(𝑃𝑡−𝑖𝐷𝑡−1)±𝛼𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
)∞𝑡=1              (14) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑡 is a term for unknown variables and 𝐶𝑁𝑊𝑡 is the Comprehensive Net Worth.   
 
In a sense, CNW translates the idea of ALM, as it incorporates assets and liabilities for 
the overall public sector and relates them to the dynamic position of the budget.  
Equation (14) shows that present value of the sovereign varies according to the initial 
reported net worth and the discounted value of subsequent cash flows.  To the degree 
that CNW is not equal to zero, a gap emerges between meeting the solvency constraint 
and current policy settings. If CNW > 0 , this means that government has a positive 
solvency balance or buffer which could provide a funding basis for policy shifts, 
without recourse to increased taxation.   On the other hand, if CNW < 0, the sovereign 
will have to do something different to meet its obligations. 
 
A recurrent problem fiscal authority face is that not all assets reported in their balance 
sheets are up to their hand.  For example, governments have declared SOE as strategic 
assets and have signaled not to sell those companies. Though they are reported as a 
positive asset in the balance sheet (affecting CNW as they generate dividends and cash 
flows), it is not really at government’s disposal to manage their flows.  The same 
reasoning can be used as a justification not to include some asset classes such as 
physical goods, forests, seacoast and cultural heritage in the RNW (thus departing from 
recommended GAAP standards). 
 
Now, a method could be established to determine CNW and RNW targets, associated 
with the optimal level of CNW and best path for RNW.  To do that, an objective 
function for the sovereign balance sheet management must be defined.  Bradbury et al 
(1997) researched that a common normative mindset for the government is to maximize 




The sovereign makes a series of decisions relying on the specific welfare function 
which have, in turn, effects on its financial position. While maximizing that function 
economic efficiency ensures optimizing welfare as this allows policy decisions to be 
implemented at least cost. That is, optimal balance sheet management may be seen as 
including efficient management and efficient financing, tandem to monitoring asset and 
liability portfolio in a way which imposes the least cost on the economy as a whole. 
Economic efficiency is adopted as the appropriate criterion for assessing optimality of 
CNW. Under this approach, solving for the optimal level of CNW and the optimal path 
of RNW becomes a matter of solving for the most efficient sovereign financing decision 
(the choice between debt financing and tax financing through time).  The result of that 
optimization problem in the simple model was then established in which it is best to set 
the CNW target equal to zero, to smooth the tax rate through time, and in which the 
RNW path is a residual of these higher order policy decisions. 
 
The problem with that simple model is that it relies on unrealistic hypothesis.  Among 
them, there are efficient capital markets, certainty on government’s commitment to 
credibly follow its policy settings, no agency costs and that the financing and operating 
decisions are strictly separable.  By relaxing those hypotheses, one would have to 
consider other constraints in the policy decision.  
 
First, when CNW = 0 and tax smoothing is enhanced, it implicitly requires a 
simplification where the process of determining the expenditure stream is entirely 
independent of the decision as to how to finance these expenditures
13
.  This is not really 
plausible as financing decisions are dependent on the financial position at each time t. 
Hence the optimal RNW path and other balance sheet variables will be disturbed 
influencing the intertemporal profile of the tax rate. Bradbury at al (1997) argue that 
specifically, these constraints are designed to minimize the sum of the inefficiencies 
created by deviating from a tax smoothing position and the inefficiencies in the 
operating decisions created by certain balance sheet positions. 
 
Second, there are agency costs associated with the balance sheet management.  As 
discussed in Proite (2014), it is quite challenging to align incentives and objectives of 
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 Such an assumption is consistent with the standard separation between operating and financing 
decisions (eg the Fisher Separation Principle and the Modigliani Miller Irrelevance Proposition) 
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each relevant government segment responsible for a given asset/liability.  Agency costs 
can be expected to arise, in large part, from the negative impact on the efficiency of 
decision making generated as a result of the existence of a portfolio of financial assets. 
To illustrate, regional government relations may limit the level of intertemporal 
transfers of wealth, in situations where other jurisdictions have distinct expenditure 
profiles but adopt a similar balanced budget tax rate strategy.  The optimal results of 
smoothing the tax rate such that CNW = 0, as identified above, may dissipate to the 
extent that these agency problems are prevalent. The policy response is to reduce the 
level of agency costs expected by limiting the paths of key assets on the balance sheet 
defining which types of assets a given agency could hold and interference on their 
liabilities management from the central government views.  Constraints may then be 
imposed which restrict the path of gross financial assets to within certain bounds, either 
in absolute terms or as a proportion of GDP. 
 
Third, the sovereign may face unanticipated financial distress in a given period. This 
would hinder its capacity to satisfy intertemporal budget constraint consistently, 
imposing bounds on net debt path through time (also on RNW).  Historical stylized 
facts show that financial shocks burdens the debtor and deteriorate credit outlook, 
increasing the costs to raise capital as RNW becomes negative and net debt augments.  
This may very well impact other elements of the balance sheet.  Because sovereign 
credit risk profile is considered a benchmark for risk analysis for corporates, SOE and 
local governments, a reduced credit rating will likely to depress the level of economic 
activity, both in the current period and in future periods. 
 
The implications of inserting constraints to the balance sheet will affect the 
intertemporal tax rate determination, but no effect on the present value of tax revenue 
required to be raised.  Essentially, if taxes are reduced along the way the intertemporal 
budget constraint will not be met and, eventually, taxes will have to be raised in the 
future, provided debt limits will be met. The broader these constraints are, the less the 
impact on the setting of the tax rate. This in turn suggests a significant movement from 
a tax smoothing policy to something closer to a balanced budget tax rate approach 




Finally the conclusions of this discussion are that levying a precautionary amount of 
taxation can only be justified when the balance sheet assumes certain positions, notably 
with respect to the net debt position. For all other positions, no precautionary taxation 
can be justified. However, at some stage a deviation from the CNW target caused by 
shocks (perhaps over a number of periods) will require a change in the tax rate to ensure 
that sustainability is achieved. The point at which this occurs will be determined by an 
efficiency calculus. It is therefore not strictly necessary, from an economic efficiency 
perspective, to have liquid reserves on the balance sheet in the form of a precautionary 
buffer at all times, although it is understood that it would enhance market confidence.  
In sum, the argument is that the size of the optimal precautionary buffer is determined 
by the structure of the balance sheet. As a general statement the structure of the balance 
sheet determines the optimal precautionary buffer and thereby the optimal level of 
CNW. 
 
It is noteworthy that the discussions above were led respectively by Australia and New 
Zealand.  They enhanced the balance sheet approach and developed an interesting 
analytical framework capable of supporting long term policy decisions, intersecting real 
managerial tool (Balance Sheet) with economic theory (optimal taxation and welfare 
loss).  This was particular suitable to them once they had shrunk their indebtedness 
considerably towards very comfortable ratios
14
 allowing to consider other liabilities on 
the government spectrum and be less susceptible to unseen shocks.  This paper has 
pointed that sort of analysis could also be employed even when debt levels are higher 
than the presented cases.    
 
 
3- Debt Simulation Models and the ALM approach 
 
One may insulate public finances from vulnerabilities that arise from macroeconomic 
structure susceptible to a variety of weaknesses, such as external shocks, in order to 
avoid having to cope with unexpected increases in costs.  The objective is to create the 
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conditions to conduct proper analysis of debt portfolio15  and create the set up- financial 
and institutional- capable to buffer debt management in a shaky environment. 
As pointed earlier, many countries commonly consider and define risk as deviations 
from debt servicing cash flows, examining the potential destabilizing impact of these 
outflows in public finances (budget, taxes and spending).  Moreover, it is often the case 
where government revenues or spending vary in the same direction with the same 
financial variables that drive debt service.  Hence, risk analysis envisages contrasting 
the impact of financial variables to debt service -the main government liability- as well 
as the impact on government net revenues –the main government asset, which lead the 
analysis to an ALM approach. 
 
The basic idea of constructing risk models is fairly simple.  It begins with modeling the 
liability side, the fundamental task of debt managers, and then evolves to add the assets. 
The most traditional assets are originated in the fiscal side (example: tax receipts 
incoming cash flows) and, additionally, other assets may be included such as FX-
reserves. Although seemingly simple, it requires sound communication between the 
fiscal and monetary authorities.  The reason behind this is that debt managers talk to 
FX-reserve managers (normally confined to the Central Bank) then align their 
projections on the balance of payments (BoP) behavior to formulate debt strategy, 
knowing the fact that FX-reserves observe different dynamics, exogenous from debt 
movements.  Debt managers benefit from FX reserve levels, its effects on market risk 
and unwind issuances strategies accordingly. It is not the case where FX-reserve 
managers will conduct their operations upon debt management guidelines. It is the other 
way around and in an indirect fashion. 
 
Coordination plays an important role her,though it is hardly the case where debt 
managers have total flexibility to conduct pure ALM to fully hedge their obligations.  
They are constrained to choose a set of strategies that are conditional on the realization 
of other variables which are not under their control, than adjust to it.  An important 
distinction must be made regarding the communication across government agencies and 
transparency.  If the Central Bank reveals its future moves regarding currency 
intervention and FX-reserves accumulation (say, size and currency composition), debt 
                                                             
15 Including contingent liabilities 
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managers could anticipate that and react to implement a strategy, that is, issuing bonds 
with similar characteristics of the reserves.  This potentially has a reassuring effect on 
market participants reducing risk perception.  Conversely, if Central Bank’s policy on 
foreign reserve management is opaque, debt managers could be surprised and would 
find it more difficult to unveil adequate debt strategies.   Once more, cooperation, 
transparency and coordination appear to be vital to conduct ALM effectively.  
 
On the top of it, intrinsic difficulties emerge on forecasting FX-reserve movements as it 
depends on random variables related to the BoP, exchange rate regime, openness of the 
economy, external liquidity etc.  It may also be difficult to forecast as tax revenues, 
which is highly correlated to GDP growth
16
, but might be dependent on other variables 
such as the commodities prices, trade links etc. Having that said, the scope for analytical 
models to simulate assets and liabilities seem to be reduced because this particular 
financial asset usually is the most representative on government’s portfolio.  
Nonetheless, after a point where reserves largely exceed short-term obligations, the 
benefits of increments in reserves start to be of less impact on risk perception.  Thus, 
precise forecast on their movements tend to be of less importance if debt levels are 
significantly lower than this asset. 
 
Most models start with projections on debt service path (principal and interest), based 
on the maturity structure (time related payments profile), debt composition (interest 
type related to the outstanding debt) and assumptions regarding borrowing 
requirements, future interest and exchange rates [Velandia, (2002)]. The current 
composition of the debt is known, so one must solely project the financial variables to 
devise future cash flows and consider the debt strategy (ongoing issuances or contracts) 
for accounting debt roll over in order to compute the debt servicing flows of the new 
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 In turn, GDP and tax collections may also be exposed to commodities prices, international trade links, 
geopolitical risk etc. 
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Elaborated by the author 
 
Because the new borrowing requirements are uncertain, future debt servicing flows 
depend entirely on the projections of interest and exchange rates (or such variables as 
inflation if the debt is inflation indexed).  One can derive these projections in two 
fashions: (i) Deterministic; (ii) Stochastic. 
 
By (i), cost is determined by a baseline scenario designed to be market-neutral, whereas 
risk is given by debt servicing costs under various scenarios of future interest and 
exchange rate shocks to the baseline scenario. The nature – size, length, time – of these 
shocks are also created by debt managers considering their sensitivity about the 
economic environment in which they are inserted.  For the deterministic simulation, 
past shocks - in the country, or in the region- can be used directly as estimates of future 
interest and exchange rates in worst case scenarios. 
 
As for (ii) cost is generated by simulation techniques – such as Monte Carlo, 
Bootstrapping- through a large number of interest, inflation and exchange rate paths, 
each of which generates a specific number forecasting the upcoming debt service flow. 
One might choose to specify a parametric function to model these variables and to 
derive stochastic scenarios.  Common references are the one-factor equilibrium 
parametrization of interest rates such as CIR, CKLS for FX-rate and GBM for 
inflation
17
.    
 
                                                             
17 CIR- Coz, Ingersoll and Ross- model. The CKLS (Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff and Sanders) model is a 
generalization of the CIR model.  GBM- Geometric Brownian Motion.  See Cabral et al (2008) and Proite 
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Cost is represented by the mean of all possible scenarios and risk is measured based on 
any dispersion of debt servicing paths around the mean, for instance, its variance. 
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical example. 
 
Figure 2 – Description of a Stochastic Simulation of Debt Service 
 
Source: Brazilian National Treasury and the World Bank (2010)  
 
As can be noticed, the measures of cost and risk depend on the way future interest and 
exchange rates are projected, and the output of the model is as good as the assumptions 
used for projecting these key financial variables.  In determining the cost, either through 
stochastic or deterministic simulation, it is essential that financial variables projections 
to be in line with market prices. 
    
Velandia (2002) argues that, where liquid securities markets permit, interest and 
exchange rate projections should be taken from the forward markets
18
.   The input for 
these “risk scenarios” is provided on the basis of historical information gathered from 
these markets. However, it is actually quite rare the case where the DMO has all these 
conditions satisfied.  In most cases public debt bond market is so underdeveloped, that 
there are virtually no market instruments capable of providing inputs for this kind of 
analysis.  Furthermore, it often the case in which interest rate and exchange rate are 
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 Also, additional assumptions on interest rate are made.  For example, well-functioning forward 
interest and exchange rate markets, interest parity, pure arbitrage, market neutral projections. When 
moving to the analysis of risk by assessing the potential impact of financial shocks on debt servicing 




arbitrarily fixed (exogenous), with absolute no connection with fair market values 
whatsoever. 
 
To illustrate, essential rigidities might also come from the market.  Aside from fixed 
exchange rate, market interest rates management by the monetary authority may be 
disconnected from market references.  Regulated investors may be forced to buy 
securities at a given interest rate level. For example, pension funds and commercial 
banks have been nationalized in some Latin American countries.  In Bolivia, there were 
two auctions in 2012, despite weekly offers from the domestic debt issuer.  In 
Nicaragua, the same scenario was observed where few commercial banks buy short-
term bills to manage liquidity.  These highlight how difficult it would be to gather 
market parameters in the way is usually treated in these models.      
 
When available, historical volatilities should be applied to the baseline case projections, 
and used as parameters of an interest or exchange rate generating process following a 
specified statistical probability distribution. The specification of a statistical distribution 
(usually assumed to be log-normal) allows the dispersion about the mean to be 
associated with a probability level. This permits the specification of a confidence 
interval for the potential increase in debt servicing costs to be used as a meaningful 




These elements are vital to debt managers, who must use their discretion to evaluate the 
trade-offs existing in whether building deterministic models, priming for simplicity, or 
going for stochastic ones, incurring in the chance of adding unnecessary burden to the 
analysis.   
 
3.1- Using Stochastic Methods to Derive Risk Measures 
 
A number of risk measures can be extracted to study the effects of a given debt strategy 
on the overall portfolio.  In essence, stochastic models such as VaR (Value at Risk), 
                                                             
19 Financial wire services such as Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters provide stylized shock scenarios that 
can be applied on given circumstances whereas normality assumptions no longer apply to historical 
data, subjected to disruptive market events. 
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CaR (Cost at Risk), CFaR (Cash Flow at Risk), BaR (Budget at Risk) are used to 
estimate risk measures.  These are all variations from traditional VaR, that can be 
applied in other contexts to simulate debt levels under different states of the nature.  
 
To give a short introduction, Value at Risk is a summary number that quantifies the 
worst possible loss of a portfolio at a given confidence interval, usually taken as 5%, 
over a given time horizon. The two parameters that can be chosen therefore are the 
confidence interval (usually between 95% and 99%) and the time horizon (depends on 
the institution but usually 1 day, with some going out to 5 days for banking purposes or 
even a month).  A few things must be kept in mind.  First, VaR is based on the 
parameters that are fed into the model.  Decisions about data, length of time series etc 
must be made which will impact the VaR reported and its estimates will differ 
depending on these parameters.  Second, time horizon – if this is too long, then the 
assumption of holding the portfolio constant becomes unrealistic
20
.  Hence, debt 
managers may wish to recalculate VaR periodically. 
 
Figure 3 – VaR for Brazilian Debt Portfolio (BRL mn) 
 
 
Source: Brazilian National Treasury 
 
It is relatively simple to calculate the VaR for a given debt portfolio to infer the 
probabilistic value of the market having to absorb a public security price shock. For 
example, Brazilian debt managers applied this method for the fixed rate portion of the 
portfolio in order to assess the impact of interest rates volatility in a context where 
                                                             
20 There is a vast literature of VaR and its variations.  The reader can refer to  Jorian, P.(2007). 
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nominal instruments were growing fast in the overall composition.  The chart above 
shows that, in a given month, there was a 5% probability that the maximum loss would 
not be superior to BRL 250 mn, on average, due to increases in interest rates. It could 
rather be used to the overall portfolio, as illustrated in the following topic. 
 
Using analytical VaR is the easiest method to implement when calculating worst 
possible loss of a portfolio at a given confidence interval. All that is needed is a time 
series of the assets (example: equities held by the government) /liabilities (debt bonds) 
prices outstanding.  This could be useful for those countries that are in the early stages 
of accessing the market, both domestic and internationally.  For instance, Paraguay, 
Bolivia and Honduras issued Global bonds for the first time in 2012 and have started to 




Transposing the idea above into debt costs brings the discussion back to the main 
context discussed in this article.  Cost-at-Risk (CaR) is a supplementary measure used 
in the management of the interest-rate risk on the domestic central-government debt. 
CaR quantifies the risk on the debt and gives important input to the weighting of 
interest-rate risk against costs.  It reflects that a central element of government debt 
policy providing a suitable weighting of costs against risk, when the borrowing strategy 
is determined [Danmarks Nationalbank, (1999)].  A distinction is made between 
absolute and relative CaR. Absolute CaR is the difference between the future 
outstanding debt, in view of a given level of significance and its initial value. Relative 
CaR measures the difference between this same maximum value of outstanding debt 
debt at a given significance level and the average distribution of future outstanding debt.  
In many instances, CaR is also used as a supplement to duration and the measure to 
monitor the impact of varied issuances strategies in the debt profile, under the cost-risk 
space. 
 
The Danish National Bank uses the marked part of Figure 4 in the distribution where 
indicates the size of the costs in the 5% of cases where the costs are highest. In this case 
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it is found that with a probability of 95% the costs will not exceed DKK 6.7 billion, 
equivalent to an absolute CaR of DKK 6.7 billion (DKK: Denmark Krone). With a 
mean value of DKK 5 billion, relative CaR in this case is DKK 6.7 less 5 billion = 
DKK 1.7 billion. 
 
Debt managers have to identify the relevant risk in order to properly measure it. 
Consider the case where there is maturity concentration.  In a year when interest rates 
soar, then rolling over the debt could be a lot costlier with negative impacts on 
government budget.  Hence, there are incentives to limit refinancing and interest rate 
risks distributing debt across maturities.  In this sense, CaR is used as a supplement to 
duration, with the advantage that risk is also factored in. 
 
Figure 4 –  Danish Absolute and Relative CaR – DKK bn 
 
 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank 
To calculate the CaR while simulating the future, one would need a few inputs: (i) 
Because future costs depend upon the realization of interest rates, which are in turn, 
unknown, a set of scenarios where interest rates are simulated would result in possible 
future costs. When the number of scenarios and resulting costs are large enough, a 
probability distribution of costs is generated. (ii)  The existing debt costs have to be 
accrued considering current payment flows.  (iii) Borrowing strategy is included 
alongside with budget resources dedicated to debt payment.  The combination of these 
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results in cost measures for each interest rate scenario allowing the absolute CaR 
computation. Then the mean value is extracted to compute the relative CaR.  
  The Danish National Bank proposes the following scheme: 
Figure 5 – Cost-at-Risk Computation 
                                  
Souce: Danmarks Nationalbank, (1999). Elaborated by the author. 
 
Debt managers can either use market interest rates extracted from future markets or use 
a term structure to forecast interest rates.  In the following exercise, the Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross (1985) model is used to generate various interest rates curves
21
 and devise 
illustrative strategies balancing 2y, 5y and 10 years nominal bonds between a basic, 
short-term and long term scenarios.  In the basic scenario, 40% of the bonds are 2y 
dated, 20% are 5y dated and 40% are 10y dated.  The other scenarios respectively show 
a 45%, 35%, 20% and 20%, 35%, 45% for 2y, 5y, 10y bonds.  Two more extreme 
scenarios are inserted, being one with 100% of the securities issued in 10y and other 
with 100% issued in 2y. 
 
The results in Figure 6 show clear differences in the values of both absolute and relative 
CaR for three strategies. It is also seen that the risk of incurring very high costs (long 
term bonds are costlier than short-term ones) is small for most strategies. This is a result 
of stable interest rates term structures in low levels, when compared to other countries. 
One underlying factor is that, as a consequence of efforts to equalize the redemption 
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 The AFNS –Arbitrage Free Nelson-Siegel - model was introduced in 2010 in substitution to the CIR- 
Coz, Ingersoll and Ross- model.  The main reason is that AFNS allows interest rates to be negative, a 
context which seem unrealistic in the early 2000’s, but adequate from 2008 on, after concomitant 
worldwide monetary stimulus to overcome the crisis.  For more on this, see Danmarks Nationalbank 



















profile, the debt is spread across maturity segments. All else being equal, this entails a 
lower risk. 
Figure 6 – Relative CaR and Mean Value – DKK bn  (2004)
 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank 
The differences in the expected costs for the three scenarios are modest in the first 
couple of years, but increase during the period. Based on the computed results, realistic 
borrowing strategies lead to stability in the expected nominal costs of around DKK 45 
billion in the 5-year period. This exercise contrasts short to long-term strategies and 
balances costs and risks such that, for the same period, the portfolio bares an increase in 
relative CaR of around DKK 1.4 billion. 
 
As for the periodicity of which these calculations are made, there is a natural 
requirement to consider the more short-term effect of a given borrowing strategy. The 
horizon for the calculations is therefore set at 5 years. It is assumed in the calculations 
that borrowing takes place 4 times a year, once every quarter. 
 
In Brazil, CaR computations had been made in a monthly basis.  The reason behind it 
resides in the existence of a more volatile debt composition and more instable markets, 
where interest rates in debt instruments change fast.  To compute these numbers, a 
specific software was designed to cover some of the steps mentioned earlier.  The chart 
below shows the results. It can be seen that, for 2006, debt costs would not raise more 
than 2.20% of the stock in 95% of the time.  To explain, at that period prevailed a large 
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share of short term interest rate bonds on the portfolio, tandem to a borrowing strategy 
with short term nominal bonds embedded in issuance plan. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Cost-at-Risk for Brazil (% of the outstanding debt) 
 
 
Source: Brazilian National Treasury 
 
Other countries use this type of calculations to assess risk.  The Czech Republic’s MoF 
quarterly publishes review to present the underlying debt portfolio risk management 
measures and performance with respect to the planned annual financing program and 




B. Cash Flow-at-Risk 
Similar rationale can be applied to address other questions related to the cash flow 
expected in a certain period.  The Cash Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) determines, with a given 
significance level, the maximum payments expected in the determined future. 
Cashflow-at-Risk is an attempt to create an analogue to Value at Risk (VaR) that can be 
used by debt managers to quantify various kinds of risk exposures, including interest 
rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks. [Stein et al, (2001)].  It increases the 
forecast ability in the budget elaboration process and assessment of public borrowing 
requirement, reducing the refinancing risk.  Interestingly, it includes some assets and 
also a breakdown of the liabilities considering not only state debt, but also the 
derivatives portfolio and state guarantees [Czech MoF, (2007)].  
                                                             
22 Since 2005. 
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CFaR could also be used in the asset side, to help managers addressing a variety of  
financial decisions. For example, by providing estimates of the probability of financial 
distress, the CFaR method can be used in conjunction to the capital structure data to 
help formulate the amount of equity a government may hold in a more precise, 
quantifiable fashion. Moreover, it can especially helpful for those countries with the 
external sector based on the commodities cycle, with state owned companies figuring 
among an important revenues source.  It can also be used to evaluate government 
overall risk management strategy, including the expected benefits of using derivatives 




Figure 9 shows the outcomes of these kind of exercises for the debt portfolio in a given 
period in Brazil.  With a 95% confidence interval, on average, the maximum amount 
that could be disbursed would be around BRL 370 mn (approximately USD 180 mn) 
during 2006 The right hand side of Figure 8 displays the CFaR in terms of the 
outstanding stock. That path is mostly explained because of the FX-linked rate bonds on 
the portfolio, though shrinking in the overall profile, was still capable of imposing cash 
flow risks.  To offset that, the DMO bought foreign currency in advance from the 
market or from the official reserves at Central Bank, thus, constituting a liquidity 
cushion. 
Figure 8 – CFaR in Brazil 
 




                                                             





The Budget-at-Risk (BaR) measures, given a significance level, the uncertainty 
associated with the debt budget. BaR takes into account primary government 
expenditures and revenues in addition to the interest expenditure in order to smooth the 
budget balance. To put it differently, BaR would measure the deviations from revenues 
in respect to the overall expenditures and would favor debt strategies with low interest 
payments at times of high primary deficits, for example. 
 
More specifically, it has commonly been used to measure the probability that the 
forecasted expenditures with the debt for a given year to surpass the amount approved 
by the legislative.   
 
Because debt service is measures in monetary terms (cash flows), BaR is similar to 
CFaR, while both measure changes in uncertain future flows.  By knowing the 
probability of exceeding the legislative authorization for the budget, debt managers may 
anticipate and avoid the potential gridlocks and time-consuming negotiations with the 




4. The Liability Side in light of the Assets Characteristics 
 
The most straightforward way to link the modeling of the liabilities with the 
government’s assets is by using the financial characteristics of the assets as the means to 
measure cost and risk for the liabilities. These metrics consist of: (a) currency 
denomination – the currency most closely correlated to the government cash flows of 
revenues and expenditures24; (b) Maturity structure - the time horizon to carry out the 
simulation which is the basis to measure interest rate risk. 
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At this point it is important to consider the structure of the external sector.  Even if a 
given country may have all of its revenues and expenditures denominated in local 
currency, it might be still exposed to foreign exchange rate, depending on how 
integrated with the world its external sector is.  This means that macroeconomic 
structure must be factored in:  openness of the economy, trade links, dollarization ratio, 
commodity dependence so on.  For instance, Latin American countries displayed a 
number of examples with high exposure to these factors and the external environment. 
Hence, it would be useful to include some measure of sensitivity of revenues to the FX-
rate.  For example, estimate the impact on the revenues (including asset returns) under 
different scenarios.  Apparently, this could be very cumbersome in case of more 
complex economies such as the Brazilian one, but still feasible in countries with simpler 
economic structures. 
 
Once local currency instruments are chosen, analogous reasoning can be applied to 
evaluate inflation risk associated with the monetary policy.  Because revenues and 
expenditures might have different response to price shocks, one must understand the 
nature of the local economic structure and stability to assess instrument selection and 
decide whether to issue nominal, fx-linked or inflation-linked debt. Typically, many 
countries carry a positive correlation between tax revenues and inflation, while 
expenditures do not necessarily follow similar trend. If that is so, inflation-linked 
securities might find a natural hedge on the asset side.  On the other hand, supply 
shocks, reduce the availability of goods and services and tend to shrink real government 
revenues. Nominal debt, in this case is not as harmful as inflation indexed debt. [World 
Bank, (2001)]. 
 
To this matter, the BSA may help to provide the initial clues on how an ALM could be 
conducted and provide useful information to build the model
25
.  The Brazilian case 
showed that the federal government had leeward to explore the inflation linked market 
without imbalances in public finances [Proite, (2014)].  
                                                             
25 On the top of that, portfolio theory provide important argument for diversification. 
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As for the maturity structure, it represents another vector that should be considered in 
the model, as long as time horizon is relevant to measure cost and, above all, interest 
risk. For instance, if the government’s revenues were highly responsive to short-term 
interest rates, (short duration or high elasticity on interest), a short term horizon would 
be preferred then long-term fixed rate instruments.  If, on the other hand, revenues were 
neutral to short-term interest rates (long duration or low elasticity on interest), a long 
time horizon would be preferred than otherwise.  In this case, the main interest rate risk 
would come from rolling over the debt.  In fact, this would represent a positive scenario 
for most debt managers. 
 
Further exploring this idea, one may ask if he could choose whether to dislocate the 
portfolio’s duration across the yield curve without incurring in excessive costs.  
Unfortunately, this is not often the case due to real constraints reigning in the market 
structure, such as shallowness, incompleteness of the investors’ base, lack of liquidity.  
For instance, when the sensitivity of the stream of net revenues to interest rates is 
known, this implies that the interest rate risk of the government debt portfolio can be 
measured as the volatility of debt service over a time horizon which corresponds to the 
duration of the government’s assets (revenues). This interest rate risk will be minimized 
if the liability portfolio is structured to have the same sensitivity, or, duration as the 
assets. 
 
Nonetheless, it is very unlikely that debt managers would have the ability to measure 
that sensitivity in a systematic way, other than establishing ex-post correlations.  Hence, 
it would be troublesome to find consistency in those parameters. In practice, 
government’s assets correlation to interest rates could be positive or negative depending 
on whether interest rate shocks are demand or supply driven. Since such shocks tend to 
be random over a long time horizon relevant to the government’s objectives, that 
average is for revenues to have a low or zero correlation to interest rates. This is 
equivalent of an asset with long duration and implies a long time horizon for analyzing 
the risk of the debt portfolio [Velandia, (2002)]. Since in most countries, duration of the 
government’s assets tends to be long, the time horizon should also be long. Hence, time 
horizon, or maturity structure emerges as a predominant aspect in the dimensions 
considered in the model.  
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In essence, the metrics for the currency and the time horizon provides good reasoning to 
manage the liabilities. To see that, one may be able to suppose that the flows of future 
fiscal surpluses the government will use to service the debt is denominated in local 
currency and has a long duration. It would be desirable that liabilities should bear those 
two main aspects. If so, the volatility of projected debt service measured in local 
currency over the time horizon will be low. If this ideal portfolio is not feasible, - due to 
market restrictions- projected debt service will be more volatile and the debtor has to 
deal with currency and interest rate risks. But the closer the portfolio comes to the 
desired metrics the lower the projected volatility and the lower the risk. Hence, by using 
the reference previously implied by the metrics, the simulation model allows the debtor 
to quantify such risks and ultimately to look for an adequate strategy to manage them. 
 
This discussion highlights the importance of finding out the financial dynamics of the 
government’s assets. But no matter how careful this analysis, it is possible that, in the 
end, some ambiguity about those true financial features remains. In fact, besides the 
financial aspects of the stream of official (state) revenues are stochastic, the events 
governing these financial features are themselves stochastic and difficult to model. That 
is the case of supply or demand driven shocks on the financial variables, terms of trade 
shocks and policy response to both type of shocks [Velandia, (2002)].  So, even if it is 
possible to estimate (on average) what those sensitivities are over a long time horizon, 
there might be periods in which those sensitivities significantly depart from their long 
term averages in a way that government’s financial position could be at risk.  
Nonetheless, debt managers may investigate the composition and structure of their most 
significant assets and act accordingly to come up with suitable debt strategies.   
 
For instance, take the example of international reserves, which managers tend to treat 
them as an exogenous asset.  Moreover, central banks are ultimately responsible for 
managing foreign reserves and tend to choose very-low risk, highly liquid assets as 
investment alternatives, such as US Treasury, or German Bundes securities 
denominated in convertible currencies [Romanyuck, (2010)].  In the past decade, a great 
deal of countries have accumulated large reserves, trending to diversify part of their 
portfolio in a quest for high yield returns 26.  Typically, none of this is under debt 
                                                             
26 See Maziad et al (2011) and IMF (2010). 
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managers control.  Despite that, they reason on the size and composition of the reserves 
and search a debt composition that minimizes cost and risk [Hansen, (2000)].   This 
could enhance market confidence in the issuer and lead them to tap in the external debt 
market, as well as conducting liability management operations such as switches and buy 
backs. Furthermore, the sole fact of reserves accumulation may have a positive impact 
in the domestic market and propitiates the implementation of debt strategies that would 
be hard to do otherwise.   
 
In respect to that, another difficulty arises: inter-agency, or intra-governmental lack of 
coordination to oversee asset and liability in an integrated way, or even share the 
information on them.  In some countries, government agencies dealing with assets (such 
as Central Banks, or Sovereign Wealth Funds) are not willing to cooperate with debt 
managers, not even on the informational ground.  Thus, most debt managers tend to 
focus in modeling the liability side. 
 
 
4.1. Including Government Assets in the Approach  
 
Until now, the discussion has been focused on the liability side where the assets are 
treated as if they were exogenous.  This approach has the intrinsic problem to make it 
more difficult to understand the financial properties of the assets, which, in turn, would 
calibrate the debt strategy design conditional on interest and exchange rate exposure and 
time-related sensitivity. The World Bank (2002) considers three ways of incorporating 
the assets in the analysis. 
 
A. Divide the government’s assets into subjacent portfolios and study the financial 
features of these smaller parts to find natural hedges.  It is similar with what`s 
been presented in the BSA because it facilities finding the sensitivity to interest 
and exchange rates for different assets and liabilities and analyzing them 
separately in terms of aggregating their correspondent cash flows. The 
underlying idea is to match the assets which carry similar financial 
characteristics with the corresponding liabilities in order to insulate –hedge - the 
overall portfolio.  The costs and risks can be modeled as described earlier.  This 
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approach reduces the problem of the indeterminacy of the assets financial 
features and potentially reduces the error of the risk estimate. 
 
B. Conduct a more explicit interaction of the simulation of the debt servicing flows 
with fiscal revenues and new borrowing requirements. 
 
C. An integrated analysis of assets and liabilities are incorporated in the model.  
Despite the straightforwardness of this idea, rare are the DMOs which carry this 
on27 .  The idea here is to explicitly model the links between the financial 
variables affecting future debt service and the variables affecting government 
revenues. 
 
Velandia (2002), points that one way of doing it is to build a model considering the 
effects of macroeconomic variables on financial variables.  Specifically, that would 
describe domestic short-term interest rates as a function of inflation and GDP real 
growth respecting economic theory and predetermined correlations such as the Phillips’ 
curve28. This approach has the advantage of solving the interest rates for a given value 
of the macro variables guaranteeing consistency between the two. 
 
The problem, however, is that one must select functional forms to define “reaction 
functions” and establish correlations between economic and financial variables that 
might be inappropriate.  One may lack of information to perform this task.  To highlight 
that, depending on whether the nature of a particular shock (growth pace, inflation, fx-
rate movements), those correlations may change. On the top of that, there is no general 
equilibrium theory on how real economic-financial variables are jointly determined, 
which justifies the adoption of exogenous customization of these relationships. 
 
Alternatively, one might come up with these correlations from actual data, estimating a 
variance-covariance matrix containing all relevant variables. Nonetheless, the problem 
                                                             
27
 The SNDO – Swedish National Debt Office- has attempted to do so.  Its organizational structure 
facilitates that set up, though, with good coordination with other government agencies and fair 
monitoring of contingent liabilities. 
28 Where growth is positively correlated with higher inflation ratios. 
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“lies in the large number of correlation coefficients that needs to be estimated –
exchange rates with different currencies, interest rates with different maturities for 
different currencies, and a set of macro variables for the local economy and for the 
relevant foreign economies ”- [Velandia (2002)] because the data requirements increase 
largely depending on the number of unknowns for the estimates to be statistically 
reliable. Moreover, one must also choose a probability distribution for that variance-
covariance matrix in order to allow statistical inference (construct confidence intervals) 
to find meaningful risk measures. A possible approach to reduce the number of 
coefficients to be estimated is to impose certain parameters. In essence, that is what 
most DMO do as it greatly simplifies this issue. 
 
To summarize the inclusion of ALM on a more didactic way, one may consider the 
following: First, debt managers must know in great detail the characteristics of its debt 
and be able to project its future cash flows for a chosen period, including its basic 
financing strategy.  After that, one should make inferences about the behavior of key 
variables such as interest and FX rates.  For instance, market inputs could be used to 
estimate those as much as possible. As a result, this projection of debt service flows will 
lead to find expected cost of the strategy, which should be expressed in present value.  
The second step is to derive similar cost measures based on different market rates 
assumptions. Again, it is important to describe these cost measures in present value.  
The third step enhances risk estimates, in turn, defined as the difference between the 
cash flow given an initial scenario and the deviations around it.  If one repeats this for a 
sufficiently large number of scenarios, it will have a distribution of costs, which can 
originate the mean (overall cost) and its standard deviation (risk).  Some stochastic 
methods to measure risks are presented as follows.   The fourth step is to replicate steps 
one to three for alternative strategies and analyze the trade-offs in the cost-risk space for 
each strategy. Velandia (2002) proposes the following scheme, described in Figure 9. 
 
Aside from standard deviations of different cost measures associated with particular 
scenarios, other methods have been introduced to measure risk in order to supplement 
debt managers` sensibility to the impact of interest/FX rates changes in their portfolio.   
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Figure 9– Summary on Building a Risk Model for Sovereign Debt 
 





This article showed how some countries could use a risk model for building a more 
analytical tool to understand the size and sources of risk exposures the debt may show, 
depending on the characteristics such as maturity profile and composition.  In a context 
where debt managers seek to modernize their analysis, the models presented above 
could be a starting point for implementation. While optimization of balance sheet or net 
worth are more affine to optimal taxation theory, debt service simulation models 
predominate in most DMOs. 
 
Several limitations arise when adopting the latter.  One of the most important is the 
recommendation where debt managers should rely on the usage of market indicators for 
deriving important parameters.  In most low-income countries, debt managers usually 
deal with constrained or even dysfunctional markets, making it very difficult to derive 
Step 1 
•Debt service cash flows are 
projected forward for a 
specific time horizon under 
base case assumptions of 
the funding strategy and 
future market rates.  
•The base case assumptions 
of future market rates 
should be market-neutral.  
•The stream of debt servicing 
flows gives the expected 
cost of the debt strategy 
which may be expressed 
directly as a cash flow or 
converted to present value 
Step 2  
•New projections are made 
under alternative market 
rate assumptions. 
•These alternative cases can 
be generated using 
statistical techniques, 
historical analysis, worst 
case scenarios, etc. 
•These new projections 
deviate from the most likely 
path computed in step 1.  
•Again, the cost of these risk 
scenarios can be expressed 
as cash flow or discounted 
to present value 
Step 3  
•Risk could be measured as 
the difference between the 
cash flow or present value 
of the base case in step 1, 
•The range of cash flows or 
present values of 
alternative scenarios in step 
2.  
• In stochastic simulation a 
measure of risk is obtained 
by relating a confidence 
level to the potential 
increase in debt service. 
•Measures of risk using 
confidence intervals are 
commonly known as VaR, or 
CaR. 
•VaR deals with the 
volatility of the present 
value of the debt, 
•CaR deals with the 
volatility of future debt 
servicing flows, and 
express the maximum 
expected increase in 
annual costs relative to 
the mean with a given 
probability on a given 
period. 
Step 4  
•Do 1 to 3 again for 
alternative strategies  
•Analyze the trade-offs 
existing between costs and 
risks for each strategy 
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such parameters.  Another important restriction is the fact that contingent liabilities are 
disregarded, but often surge in their reality with big impacts on debt levels.  Despite 
that, its simplifications allow the government to focus on financial variables 
endogenously, adding the possibility to simulate scenarios for interest and exchange 
rates besides their interactions.  Other important variables such as revenues flow could 
be treated exogenously, allowing the government to devise independent paths from the 
simulation of liabilities, which could strengthen the verification of diverse debt 
strategies. 
 
Last, it allows the possibility of including the asset side in the analysis.  The idea of 
breaking up the government assets in different sets of sub-portfolios facilitates the 
sensitivity analysis to changes in interest and exchange rates.  Besides facilitating its 
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